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Abstract
Our study examines the effects of mergers and acquisitions deals on the rela-
tionship between female leadership and dividend strategies for 90 UK listed
firms during the period 2006–2016. Results indicate that firms with a larger
proportion of female directors serving on the board are more likely to pay
higher dividends, but this positive finding is weaker when the firms experi-
enced a higher number of mergers and acquisitions deals. Interestingly,
extended analyses on female directors' positions show the opposing effects of
female Chairmen and female CEOs on a firm's payout strategies. Although a
female Chairman is associated with higher dividend payout levels, a female
CEO shows an adverse impact. Yet these results tend to be reversed for firms
with more merger and acquisition transactions. Our findings make a signifi-
cant contribution to a trendy but relatively limited and inconclusive topic that
links gender diversity to scrutiny intensity.
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1 | INTRODUCTION
Despite the acknowledgement made by UK industrial
firms that board gender diversity (i.e., the existence of
females on boards of directors) is an imperative factor con-
tributing to effective corporate governance mechanisms
and in turn, corporate dividend policies, prior literature
appears to be silent about how this is so (Trinh, Pham,
Pham, & Nguyen, 2018). Indeed, UK corporate governance
code (2016) presents: ‘the problems arising from “group-
think” have been exposed in particular as a result of the
financial crisis. One of the ways in which constructive
debate can be encouraged is through havinsg sufficient
diversity on the board. This includes, but is not limited to,
gender and race’. In addition, the UK governance has set a
goal that women should hold at least a third of UK board-
room positions by the end of 2020. Such an aim for gender
‘balance’ is close to its realization as the proportion of
women on board FTSE350 companies has significantly
increased from just 9% in 2010 to more than 30% in 2019
(Pooley, 2019). Whilst regulators and corporate practi-
tioners have increasingly supported the value-add of
females within the board, similar recognition has not been
shown for females to hold the most senior positions in cor-
porations, for example, female Chairmen and CEOs due to
their current under-representation (Pooley, 2019). This
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raises the question as to whether females on the board and
females representing senior roles have any influence on
corporate financial decisions, in this study particularly, on
dividend decisions of UK FTSE firms.
Empirical reflections on the impact of gender-diverse
boards on dividend payment policies are relatively negli-
gible and inconclusive, especially in the UK context.
Three exceptional and typical studies in this field are
from Chen, Leung, and Goergen (2017) and Byoun,
Chang, and Kim (2016), both of which explore a signifi-
cant positive linkage between female directors and US
corporate dividend policy, and from Elmagrhi et al. (2017)
that support the negative relationship between board
gender composition and the level of dividend payout
amongst small and medium-sized enterprises in the
United Kingdom. Despite different female-dividend rela-
tionships being obtained, both findings support the posi-
tive value-added contribution of female directors on the
board in enhancing the firms' decision-making and moni-
toring process. Specifically, the positive female-dividend
association is justified based on a preference for using
dividends as a means of reducing free cash flow, and
hence agency problems, by female directors. Conversely,
in the case of the growing business environment, for
example, emerging market (Saeed & Sameer, 2017), or
small- and medium-sized firms (Elmagrhi et al., 2017),
where firms remain exposed to potentially profitable
investments, female directors will informedly, rationally,
and professionally capture the opportunities. As a result,
they are likely to use ‘internal funds’ to finance invest-
ments instead of paying dividends.
Consequently, our study adds to the literature by
freshly examining the relationship between board gender
diversity and dividend payout decisions in the context of
UK large companies (FTSE 100). This approach is differ-
ent to the study of Elmagrhi et al. (2017), whose sample
was comprised of small and medium-sized UK firms, we
expect the opposite finding, that is, a positive relationship
between female leadership and dividend payouts because
dividend payments may be a more optimal option for
dealing with free cash-flow for mature firms, where prof-
itable investments become relatively limited.
To this end, the contributions of this research are
three-fold. First, our article complementarily adds to the
existing UK studies regarding gender-diversified boards
(e.g., Elmagrhi et al., 2017) by investigating whether UK
large FTSE100 firms with gender-diverse boards adopt
different dividend payout policies vis-à-vis those with
nongender-diverse boards. It is also interesting to explore
the findings for UK firms that may be dissimilar to those
for US counterparts found in prior studies because they
are different in terms of board structure, duality, and gov-
ernance. Particularly, for UK firms, there is the
separation of the roles of board Chairman and CEO,
whereas the majority of US firms have combined board
Chair/CEO.1 Another key point that makes a difference
in the board structure between these two countries is the
length of time that directors are permitted to serve con-
tinuously on boards. In the United Kingdom, the maxi-
mum permitted term of service for a director is an
average of 9 years; if they want to extend the period, the
firm must explain how the director's independence has
not been compromised by the extent of their commit-
ment. In the United States, however, there is a marked
reluctance to set the limitation for a term of service. Sev-
eral firms have put efforts into setting term limits in
place, but generally, the length of tenure seems not to be
considered as an issue. Furthermore, there is some varia-
tion regarding institutional settings such as regulation,
tax rules, and competition between them. For example,
there are differences between the US and UK governance
systems related to the number of firms quoted in each
stock exchange and differences in the categories of share-
holders (Faccio & Lasfer, 2000). Brockman and
Unlu (2009) state, in an analysis of 52 countries, that the
typical UK firm is 87% more likely to be a dividend-pay-
ing firm than its US counterpart. In addition, the typical
UK firm paid almost 2.80 times more dividends (as a per-
centage of sales) than its US peers. Therefore, the need to
test an empirical hypothesis in a more regulated market
with strong practices of paying out dividends such as the
United Kingdom could yield different and interesting
results.
Second, following the above differences between the
United States and United Kingdom in term of board dual-
ity, together with the aim of clarifying the value contribu-
tion of females holding top senior positions within
organizations, we also conduct in-depth analyses on
female Chairmen and female CEOs to examine the divi-
dend payout policies of female-led firms. With the differ-
ent powers and responsibilities in making the ultimate
decisions, we expect that firms that appoint female Chair-
men and female CEOs may employ dissimilar dividend
payout strategies.
Third, we bring into the picture the effects of mergers
and acquisitions (M&A) as a moderating factor influenc-
ing the relationship between female leadership and divi-
dend strategies. It is worth noting that instead of focusing
on the relationship between female directors and M&A,
we propose M&A as an important background setting for
the female-dividend association due to its influences on
firms' financing options. Specifically, as M&A is a poten-
tial value-enhancing investment, its financing method,
that is, cash, debt or equity, is an important decision to
be made. As females tend to be more risk-averse, more
conservative, and less competitive than their male
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counterparts (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer, 1999; Croson &
Gneezy, 2009; Parrotta & Smith, 2013), they are more
likely to use the internal resources (cash) to fund the
M&A investment, leaving less cash available for dividend
payout. This argument leads to our following question:
Do M&A deals affect the relationship between gender
diversity and dividend payout policy?
Using a comprehensive panel sample of 90 listed non-
financial firms traded on the London Stock Exchange
FTSE100 for the period of 2006–2016, we find that cash
dividend payouts are positively associated with the pres-
ence of female directors serving on boards of directors.
This implies that greater board gender diversity can
diminish agency conflicts between shareholders and
managers, which encourages (or, forces) the latter to pur-
sue a higher cash payout policy. As expected, in a devel-
oped business context (large and mature UK firms), the
finding is different from that obtained on small and
medium firms in the study of Elmagrhi et al. (2017).
Intriguingly, our additional analysis further highlights
the opposing effects of the gender of different positions (i.
e., Chairman and CEO) on firm payouts. Although a
female Chairman is more likely to mitigate the agency
conflicts within firms, and in turn, is related to higher
levels of dividend payouts, a female CEO shows an
adverse influence. This result can be justified by different
characteristics, roles, and power of the Chairman in com-
parison to the CEO. A female Chairman seems to be a
good candidate for overseeing and monitoring the firm,
whereas a female holding the top executive positions
tend to be more aggressive in decision making. Lastly, we
find that M&A deals play a moderating role on the rela-
tionship between female leadership and dividend policy.
That is, a higher number of M&A deals is likely to miti-
gate the positive effect of gender diversity on dividend
payouts. In addition, M&A deals have also reduced the
positive and negative effects of female Chairmen and
female CEOs, respectively. This further justifies for the
conservative nature of female Chairmen as a responsible
agent in overseeing and monitoring companies whilst
emphasizes on the more aggressive nature of female CEO
as an executive agent within firms.
Our article has several valuable practical implications.
First, larger firms should be aware of the potential bene-
fits of employing female directors in controlling their div-
idend policy. This finding can be integrated with the
previous finding on UK small- and medium-sized firms
showing a negative result, to offer UK firms a fuller pic-
ture on the gender diversity-dividend payment nexus.
Second, we have highlighted opposing effects on financial
decisions between the female Chair and the female CEO,
so UK firms should also consider the gender factor when
appointing top senior positions. Finally, M&A may be an
important event, which potentially alters the single
effects of female leadership on the board, so firms also
need to take this factor into account for their decisions.
Section 2 describes the research background and
hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the data and
variable definitions. Sections 4 and 5 report summary sta-
tistics and empirical findings/analysis, respectively. Sec-
tion 6 provides some sensitivity and robustness to the
results. Section 7 concludes the research.
2 | RESEARCH BACKGROUND
AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
Literature has documented several empirical studies (e.g.,
Adams & Ferreira, 2009; Ahern & Dittmar, 2012; Carter,
D'Souza, Simkins, & Simpson, 2010; Faccio, Marchica, &
Mura, 2016; Kanadlı, Torchia, & Gabaldon, 2018; Matsa
& Miller, 2013) with evidence of the influence of board
gender diversity on firm performance, risk-taking and
market value. These studies have argued that gender-
diverse boards are more effective monitors over a board's
strategic decision making because female directors pro-
vide unique information to the board and thereby, con-
tribute to a better understanding of the complexities of
the environment, a reduced risk of ‘group thinking’ and
more astute decisions. In addition, female directors tend
to attend board meetings more than their male counter-
parts (Adams & Ferreira, 2009), and the presence of a
female on the board can enhance the discussions on com-
plex decision problems (Gul, Srinidhi, & Ng, 2011; Miller
& del Carmen Triana, 2009). However, gender-diverse
board members with different backgrounds and skills
may have some integration problems, and thus, can nega-
tively influence a firm' financial policies. For example,
people, such as female directors, who are different from
their peers, are also more likely to be isolated. Baysinger
and Butler (1985) and Adams and Ferreira (2009) criti-
cism is that many firms tend to recruit female directors
merely as tokenism as having a gender-diverse boards
can be legitimate to the public, the media, and the gov-
ernment. Such ongoing debate over directors' gender calls
for further research on its influences on different out-
comes of firms and their financial policies.
2.1 | Gender diversity and dividend
payout strategy
A board of directors is regarded as a source of informa-
tion that helps shareholders monitor the opportunism of
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managers (Fama & Jensen, 1983). It plays a vital role in
controlling managers' decisions to ensure that these man-
agers offer their useful resources to their firm and, ulti-
mately, maximizing the shareholders' values
(Mülbert, 2010). Core, Guay, and Rusticus (2006) indicate
that weak corporate governance tends to generate high
agency costs, and hence, negatively influences firm per-
formance; and the board is established as a key device to
diminish the conflicts between owners and agents and
enhance monitoring of management.
Amongst many compositions of an effective board of
directors, agency theorists argue that the presence of
female directors on boards can strengthen monitoring
mechanisms on executives (Carter et al., 2010). They pre-
sume that female board representation is likely to
increase board independence and improve its monitoring
effectiveness as well as corporate information. Hillman
and Dalziel (2003) support this argument by stating that
a more heterogeneous boardroom serves as a superior
mechanism since a wide range of perspectives and views
might improve the board decision-making effectiveness.
Therefore, a more gender-diverse board should allow
firms to mitigate agency problems and thereby increase
governance quality.
Supporting the argument that female directors reduce
agency problems, several studies suggested that a board
with a higher representation of females tends to employ
the ‘dividend’ tool to achieve such a monitoring mission.
The finding holds for companies in Jordan (Al-
Rahahleh, 2017), Spain (Pucheta-Martínez & Bel-
Oms, 2016), and the United States (Byoun et al., 2016;
Chen et al., 2017). This is primarily because dividends are
viewed, according to the agency theory (Jensen, 1986), as
one of the most effective mechanisms for mitigating
agency problems/conflicts between the principal (share-
holders) and the agent (managers) through reducing free
cash flow which can be ineffectively used by managers
(DeAngelo, DeAngelo, & Stulz, 2006). Therefore, they are
more likely to employ ‘dividend’ cash payout as an effec-
tive monitoring tool to prevent managers from exploiting
discretionary funds.
Another rationale explaining this positive association
between female and dividend strategy is based on the dif-
ferences in behavioural cognition across gender, together
with the ‘bird in the hand’ dividend-relevance school of
Gordon (1960) and Lintner (1962). There are a huge
number of studies examining the differences between
men and women's behaviour, which contributes to differ-
ences in decision-making and the governance practices of
male and female directors. Conversely, cognitive psychol-
ogy and management studies suggest that women tend to
be more conservative and have a stronger aversion to risk
than their male counterparts (Byrnes et al., 1999; Parrotta
& Smith, 2013). Similarly, Croson and Gneezy (2009)
found that gender differences can be illustrated through
social preferences, risk attitudes, and reaction to competi-
tion. For instance, female individuals seem to be higher
risk-averse and less competitive than male counterparts,
and the social preferences of females are more malleable
than those of males. In line with this argument, Al-
Rahahleh (2017) found evidence that the differences in
the behaviour of women and men lead to multifaceted
decisions in the boardroom, which may positively con-
tribute, to the firm's improvement. He also shows that
women are likely to take lower risks than men, which
leads them to make less aggressive policy choices and
accept more sustainable investments. Such findings are
in line with the conclusion of Chen et al. (2017), which
also documents that women prefers engaging in lower
risky projects.
Firms' free cash flow can either be reinvested or dis-
tributed in the form of dividend payout. Amongst the
two, dividend payout is deemed to be the less risky option
due to the ‘instant’ cash receipts whilst returns on the
reinvestments are realized in the future and unavoidably
subject to risk. Therefore, with the more risk-averse,
more conservative, and less competitive natures of female
directors in comparison to their male counterparts, they
are more likely to distribute more dividends to
shareholders.
On the contrary side, studies of Elmagrhi et al. (2017)
conducted on small and medium-sized UK companies
and Saeed and Sameer (2017) conducted in emerging
countries including India, China, and Russia, reported
opposite findings, that is, a negative relationship between
female presence and dividend payouts. To justify this
finding, the authors focus on the complementary per-
spectives and professional experiences provided by
female directors (Hillman, Shropshire, & Cannella
Jr, 2007 and Ward & Forker, 2017). In particular, corpo-
rate boardrooms which have women are more informa-
tive, organized, and timely (Gul et al., 2011). Female
directors also provide the board with valuable knowledge
and expertise to formulate and assess strategic decisions
(Chen, Crossland, & Huang, 2016). This can help the
boards enhance their decision making on operational
control tasks in terms of the responsibilities to monitor
managerial decisions including dividends, cash flow, and
investment and so on. Given this, in the context of small
and medium-sized UK companies and emerging markets,
a gender diversified board may possess more informed
information about potential profitable investments.
Therefore, they tend to take strategic action to ‘preserve
internal funds for investment’ rather than cashing out for
dividends (Conyon & He, 2017; Saeed & Sameer, 2017,
pp. 1103).
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Adding to the literature, our study is the first to investi-
gate the gender diversity and dividend payout topic in the
context of large UK firms using the FTSE100 sample.
Based on the rationales provided for the two contradictory
findings on the female-dividend relationship, we expect a
positive relationship between female representation and
dividend payout as contradicted to the findings obtained
by Elmagrhi et al. (2017) in their study on small and
medium-sized UK companies. First of all, it is acknowl-
edged that dividend payout decisions are relatively more
relevant and critical for large firms. According to the life
cycle theory of dividend, mature, and established firms are
more likely to pay and pay higher dividends as they tend
to be ‘older, more stable, and highly profitable’ but with
less attractive investment opportunities than younger and
small firms (Bulan & Yan, 2010, pp. 179; and DeAngelo
et al., 2006). Some studies, including DeAngelo et al. (2006),
Fama and French (2001), and Grullon, Michaely, and
Swaminathan (2002), justify this finding based on the
trade-off between retention and distribution. Specifically,
large firms tend to exhibit higher levels of free cash flow,
leading to higher agency cost. As a result, it is argued that
higher dividend payout is optimal for these firms. Con-
versely, small and medium firms ‘face relatively abundant
investment opportunities with limited resources so that
retention dominates distribution’ (DeAngelo et al., 2006,
p. 228). Therefore, high dividend payout for these firms
may not be appropriate. As a result, the following hypoth-
esis will be tested:
Hypothesis 1 . There is a significantly positive relation-
ship between board gender diversity and the levels of
dividend payouts.
2.2 | Moderating effects of M&A on
gender diversity and dividend payout
strategy
M&A are one of the largest forms of corporate invest-
ment, which intensify the agency conflicts between man-
agers and shareholders of large firms (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). Managers can take advantages of M&A
activities for their own benefits at the expense of owners
through a value-destroying M&A (Masulis, Wang, &
Xie, 2007). According to the free cash-flow hypothesis
(Jensen, 1986), firms with high levels of free cash-flow
are more likely to be exposed to such suboptimal M&A
activities. As a result, one way for firms to overcome such
agency conflicts that might occur through M&A is to
establish strong corporate governance.
The literature has reported that firms employing more
female directors can improve the quality of the firms'
M&A investment. Particularly, firms that engage in M&A
activities with the aim of taking advantage of potential
synergies and hence, increasing the firms' values. Never-
theless, without sufficient due diligence in the evaluation
process, for example, managers are overlooked and over-
confident (Hayward & Hambrick, 1997 and Puranam,
Powell, & Singh, 2006), M&A can destroy firms' values.
However, firms with female representation on the board
of directors may assist in avoiding these value-destroying
M&A. Female directors, in particular, are usually more
vocal and less conformist (Adams, Gray, &
Nowland, 2011) and tend to have greater sensitivity and
caring nature than their male counterparts (Bradshaw &
Wicks, 2000), which contributes to the change in the
board dynamics and board actions (Miller & del Carmen
Triana, 2009). Moreover, prior literature (Gul et al., 2011;
Kim & Starks, 2016; Terjesen, Sealy, & Singh, 2009)
argues that female directors tend to shape more indepen-
dent thinking, increase board attendance, have better
communication skills, and make more informed deci-
sions, which helps them provide better control for organi-
zational management and monitoring CEOs' and
managers' activities more effectively than their male
counterparts. Therefore, based on the arguments that a
female presence on board is associated with the increased
comprehensiveness of intra-board discussions with ratio-
nality and informed knowledge and active oversight, the
level of M&A activities is lower (less M&A and lower
M&A values) in female-led firms (e.g., Chen et al., 2016;
Dowling & Aribi, 2013; Levi, Li, & Zhang, 2014).
In this article, the focus is moved away from the rela-
tionship between female directors and M&A. Instead, we
propose M&A as an important background setting for the
female-dividend association due to its influences on
firms' financing options. When firms identify their acqui-
sition targets, managers are required to make a decision
on financing methods, for example, cash, debt, or new
stock issuance. As mentioned, in the context of large
firms, free cash-flow level tends to be higher than firms
of smaller sizes. Hence, firms are exposed to financing
choices of whether to use the available internal resources
(i.e., cash) for dividend payment or M&A. Unlike other
daily operating decisions, M&A per se and the financing
decision for M&A are associated with intense board-level
discussion amongst directors (male and female) and
requires ultimate approval from the top senior layer of
the firms (Levi et al., 2014). With the higher risk aversion
level, female directors may opt to finance M&A by cash
as this is the least risky option in comparison to the exter-
nal resources (debt and equity), according to the Peking
Order Theory (Donaldson, 1961). As a result, the cash
resource availability will be reduced for dividend pay-
ment. Consequently, it is possible that M&A can
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moderate the level of dividend payout by female direc-
tors. Consequently, the following hypothesis will be
tested:
Hypothesis 2 . There is a significantly negative moderat-
ing influence of merger and acquisition on the rela-
tionship between board gender diversity and the
levels of dividend payouts.
3 | DATA AND VARIABLE
DEFINITIONS
3.1 | Data and sample
Our dataset covers 11 years from 2006 to 2016. The firm-
level data include FTSE 100 constituents over the esti-
mated time with yearly updating of constituent lists. Our
database includes two major categories. The first category
is corporate governance data, which consist of the number
of female directors, gender of the Chairman and CEO, the
number of nonexecutive independent directors, the total
number of directors on boards, institutional and insider
ownership. Those board-level data were obtained from
FAME database and the female FTSE reports of Dr. Val
Singh and Professor Susan Vinnicombe published by
Crandfiled University. Hand-collected data from annual
reports of individual firm website were also used for cross-
referencing purposes. The second category, that is, data on
dividends and other accounting variables (i.e., total assets,
net income, firm age, financial leverage, Tobin's q, return
on assets and return volatility) are compiled from
DataStream and firm financial statements. M&A database
for sample firms is retrieved from Bureau van Dijk's
FAME. Any deals of M&A, which even were not success-
fully completed, are still included in the main tests since
the board of directors has approved proceeding with the
deal that is indicative of the board risk attitudes. These are
in line with the study of Dowling and Aribi (2013). Finan-
cial companies are excluded from the sample (see Chen
et al., 2017), because these companies have different and
specific accounting, operating, and regulatory require-
ments compared with nonfinancial firms. Only firms with
three consecutive year data availability were kept. The
final sample includes an unbalanced panel of 90 non-
financial firms or 700 firm-year observations.
3.2 | Empirical models and variable
measures
In terms of model specification, the independent and
dependent variables are the board gender diversity and
dividend payment, respectively. Following prior literature
(e.g., Chen et al., 2017), we utilize a number of control
factors, which can potentially determine dividend pay-
ment decisions. Specifically, we estimate the baseline
empirical model as below.
Dividendi, t = α1 + β1*BGDi, t + β2*FemaleChairi, t
+ β3*FemaleCEOi, t + μ1*Z+Year dummies+ ε
where, Dividendi,t is dividend payment, measured by
cash dividend over net income (Chen et al., 2017). BGDi,t
is boardroom gender diversity, estimated by two alterna-
tive proxies including the number of female directors on
board (Byoun et al., 2016), and the fraction of female
directors on board (Chen et al., 2017). Female Chairi,t
and Female CEOi,t represent for female Chairman (i.e.,
dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the Chair is
female and otherwise 0) and female CEO (i.e., dummy
variable which takes a value of 1 if the CEO is female
and otherwise 0), respectively.
Z includes control factors that may have significant
influences on dividend payouts policy, such as firm char-
acteristics (Harford, Mansi, & Maxwell, 2008; Leary &
Michaely, 2011) and managerial entrenchment (Hu &
Kumar, 2004). More specifically, we first include M&A
variable that is measured by the number of M&A made
within a fiscal year (see Chen et al., 2016; Levi et al., 2014)
in the natural logarithm form. This variable is interacted
with main variables of interest such as board gender
diversity, female Chairman, and female CEO to examine
whether M&A deals affect the relationship between these
variables and dividend payout policy. We also include
factors related firm-level characteristics, which are firm
size, firm age, leverage, and Tobin's q, return on assets
and return volatility. Firm size (Ln[Total Assets]) is
defined as the natural logarithm of total assets. Red-
ding (1997) suggests that firm size can help explain why
companies pay dividends. Furthermore, Khoury and
Maladjian (2014) indicate that large firms distribute high
dividends as they are more competitive and tend to
appeal more investors. Consequently, it is predicted that
large firms have a greater tendency to pay high dividends.
Firm age is computed as the natural logarithm of the
firms' age that changes annually. Leverage is measured
by total debt over total assets. Tobin's q is used to mea-
sure the firm growth opportunities, measured by total
debt plus market capitalization that is defined as the
value of a firm on the stock market divided by total
assets. Literature shows that firms with high growth
opportunities tend to pay lower amount of dividends
compared to those with less growth opportunities. Return
on assets (ROA) is a proxy for profitability, computed by
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the net income over total assets. It is predicted that profit-
able companies can impose higher level of dividends
(Aivazian, Booth, & Cleary, 2003). Finally, return volatil-
ity is a measure for business conditions, computed as the
standard deviation of return on assets. According to
Fama and French (2001), the higher the return volatility,
the less likely companies pay dividends.
Control factors also include variables of managerial
entrenchment that accounts for the impacts of board
characteristics on dividend payment. Board size is esti-
mated by the total number of directors on board. Aca-
demic literature argues that larger boards tend to be
better in monitoring and supervising the opportunism of
management, which allows them to mitigate agency
problems and increase dividend distribution. Addition-
ally, empirical studies (e.g., Litai, Chuan, & Kim, 2011;
Mansourinia, Emamgholipour, Rekabdarkolaei, &
Hozoori, 2013) also report a positive association between
board size and firm payouts. Consequently, it is predicted
that dividend payment is positively influenced by board
size. Board independence is calculated by the ratio of the
number of independent directors and board size. Abor
and Fiador (2013) document that independent directors
have a negative impact on dividend payment. Similarly,
Al-Najjar and Hussainey (2009) state that dividends are
adversely related to the representation of independent
directors on boards of 400 firms in the United Kingdom.
Therefore, it is expected to have an adverse association
between independent directors and corporate dividend
payouts. We further add two ownership variables into the
models, which comprise of institutional ownership (i.e.,
the percentage of a firm stock held by institutional inves-
tors) and insider ownership (i.e., the percentage of a firm
stock held by insiders) (Rozeff, 1982). Moreover, year
dummies are used to capture for the year fixed effects.
We use the function of robust standard errors to control
for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity. Table 1 reports
definitions of all variables.
4 | SUMMARY STATISTICS
Table 2 depicts the summary statistics of all variables,
which are included in the empirical models. For depen-
dent ones, the proxy of the ratio of cash dividends over net
income is used. It can be seen that the ranges of this vari-
able is from 0 to 99.1%, with an average of 38.4% and stan-
dard deviation of 0.241. For the main interest independent
variables, results show that the number of female directors
serving on board, averagely, is two people. This accounts
for 16.77% of the total directors of the whole board. The
maximum number of female directors and their propor-
tion are six directors and 50%. This implies a significant
lower presence of those females in UK firms working for a
board. Remarkably, some companies do not have females
serving as a board member (min of 0). These two alterna-
tive measures of the board gender diversity (fraction of
female directors and number of female directors) have low
standard deviation of 0.104 and 1.15.
Table 3 presents the Pearson correlation between
each pairs of explanatory variables included in the empir-
ical models. As suggested by Kennedy (2003), the level at
which multicollinearity phenomenon of two variables
TABLE 1 Variable definitions
Variable Definition
Dividend/net
income
Cash dividend over net income
Dividend/TA Cash dividend over total assets
Dividend yield The yield of cash dividends
Propensity to pay The propensity (likelihood) to pay cash
dividends
Fraction of female
directors
Board-level gender diversity, defined as
the fraction of female directors on
board
Number of female
directors
Board-level gender diversity, defined as
the number of female directors on
board
Female chair Dummy variable which takes a value of 1
if the chair is female and otherwise 0
Female CEO Dummy variable which takes a value of 1
if the CEO is female and otherwise 0
Ln(board size) The natural logarithm of total number of
directors on board
Board
independence
The ratio of the number of independent
directors and board size (%)
Ln(M&A) The number of mergers and acquisitions
deals in the natural logarithm form
Institutional
ownership
The percentage of institutional
ownership
Insider ownership The percentage of insider ownership
Ln(total assets) The natural logarithm of total assets
Firm age The natural logarithm of the firms' age
that changes annually
Leverage Total debt over total assets
Tobin's q Total debt plus market capitalisation that
is defined as the value of a firm on the
stock market divided by total assets
ROA Net income over total assets
Return volatility The standard deviation of return on
assets
Note: This table presents the definitions of all variables used in the
regression models.
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exists is around 0.80. This means that if the correlation of
two explanatory variables is lower than 0.80, there is no
remarkable relationship between these two factors. The
table indicates that the correlation of all pairs of variables
is weak or moderate (<0.80) indicating that
multicollinearity phenomenon does not occur amongst
independent variables. Therefore, these variables can be
used in the same models.
5 | EMPIRICAL FINDINGS AND
ANALYSIS
5.1 | Board gender diversity and
dividend payouts levels: The effect of
merger deals
Table 4 (Panels A and B) presents the ordinary least
square (OLS) regression results where the dependent var-
iable is the decisions for dividend payment calculated by
dividends over net income (Dividend/Net Income).
Whilst Panel A reports findings when using the number
of female directors as a proxy for board gender diversity,
Panel B provides results for the fraction of female direc-
tors (%) as an alternative measure.
In Panel A, the four regressions from Regressions 1 to
4 vary depending on different gender variables that are
added. This study starts the multivariate analysis by
regressing the dividend decision variable on the number
of female directors serving on the board of directors, and
its interaction with M&A (Regression 1). In addition to
the Regression 1, Regressions 2–4 consist of different gen-
der variables and interactions. Specifically, Regression 2
includes Female Chair and Female CEO; Regression 3
adds the interaction between Female Chair and M&A;
Regression 4 includes full set of gender variables (i.e.,
board gender diversity, Female Chair, and Female CEO)
and their interactions with M&A variable.
Across all these regressions, we find that the coeffi-
cients of the BGD on dividend levels are statistically and
significantly positive at 1% level of significance. This find-
ing implies a robustly positive linkage between board
gender diversity and dividends. This means, when the
number of female directors increases, cash dividend pay-
ment increases. The result supports for the hypothesis set
in this study that female directors have greater tendency
to impose high dividends as a monitoring device than
male directors. This is also in line with the findings of
previous studies such as Chen et al. (2017) and as
expected, the findings are in opposition with those of
TABLE 2 Summary statisticsVariables N Mean p50 SD Min Max
Dividend/net income 700 0.384 0.392 0.241 0 0.991
Dividend/TA 700 0.029 0.023 0.027 0 0.244
Dividend yield 700 2.597 2.490 1.887 0 18.180
Ln(M&A) 625 1.791 1.791 0.922 0 5.252
Fraction of female directors 700 16.777 16.667 10.382 0 50
Number of female directors 700 1.813 1.999 1.150 0 6
Female chair 700 0.004 0 0.065 0 1
Female CEO 700 0.066 0 0.248 0 1
Ln(board size) 700 2.350 2.303 0.209 1.792 2.944
Board Independence 700 0.631 0.636 0.143 0 1.111
Institutional ownership 700 67.946 69.520 0.256 8.220 100
Insider ownership 700 1.183 0.030 0.0852 0 74.99
Ln(total assets) 700 16.059 15.910 1.301 12.880 19.441
Firm age 700 3.790 3.784 1.121 0 6.215
Leverage 700 0.250 0.238 0.145 0 0.724
Tobin's q 700 1.587 1.266 1.027 0.295 9.785
ROA 700 7.104 6.488 6.394 −24.306 63.081
Return volatility 700 3.999 3.069 3.405 0.278 36.048
Note: This table presents the descriptive statistics, including minimum, mean, maximum and
SD, of all variables used in the research with 700 firm-year observations. Table 1 provides defi-
nitions of the variables in the model.
Abbreviations: M&A, mergers and acquisitions; ROA, return on assets; TA, total asset.
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TABLE 4 Ordinary least square regression results—the impact of board gender diversity, female Chair and female CEO on dividend
payout levels: the effect of M&A deals
Panel A—BGD: number of female directors Panel B—BGD: fraction of female directors
Dependent variable: Dividend/net income Dividend/net income
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
BGD 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.071*** 0.067*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.001)
Ln(M&A) 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.017 0.006 0.007 0.008 0.006
(.434) (.414) (.400) (.383) (.748) (.722) (.708) (.757)
BGD*ln(M&A) −0.013* −0.013* −0.013* −0.011* −0.001** −0.001*** −0.001*** −0.001***
(.097) (.094) (.092) (.094) (.024) (.006) (.005) (.004)
Female chair 0.195*** 0.425** 0.428** 0.188*** 0.448** 0.455**
(.004) (.028) (.027) (.007) (.020) (.019)
Female chair*ln(M&A) −0.235*** −0.238*** −0.242*** −0.246***
(.003) (.003) (.002) (.002)
Female CEO −0.009** −0.009** −0.076* −0.023** −0.022** −0.062*
(.035) (.043) (.063) (.019) (.026) (.072)
Female CEO*ln(M&A) 0.055*** 0.054**
(.002) (.022)
Ln(board size) −0.090 −0.092 −0.093 −0.088 −0.020 −0.022 −0.023 −0.017
(.149) (.142) (.138) (.166) (.734) (.711) (.692) (.776)
Board independence −0.142** −0.138** −0.139** −0.136** −0.150** −0.147** −0.148** −0.144**
(.022) (.027) (.026) (.030) (.015) (.017) (.017) (.021)
Institutional ownership −0.005 −0.000 −0.001 0.002 −0.008 −0.005 −0.006 −0.003
(.898) (.992) (.983) (.950) (.841) (.893) (.884) (.934)
Insider ownership 0.294** 0.294** 0.292** 0.298** 0.288** 0.290** 0.288** 0.290**
(.022) (.022) (.023) (.021) (.028) (.026) (.027) (.027)
Ln(total assets) 0.024** 0.024** 0.024** 0.023** 0.025** 0.025** 0.025** 0.023**
(.020) (.019) (.019) (.030) (.015) (.015) (.014) (.023)
Firm age 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.007
(.501) (.503) (.507) (.447) (.547) (.511) (.515) (.459)
Leverage 0.191*** 0.189*** 0.186*** 0.182*** 0.192*** 0.190*** 0.187*** 0.183***
(.004) (.004) (.005) (.006) (.003) (.004) (.004) (.005)
Tobin's q 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.010
(.309) (.287) (.279) (.326) (.328) (.319) (.311) (.354)
ROA 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.004***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Return volatility −0.014*** −0.014*** −0.014*** −0.013*** −0.014*** −0.014*** −0.014*** −0.014***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 0.115 0.108 0.110 0.118 −0.037 −0.043 −0.040 −0.032
(.469) (.495) (.490) (.454) (.803) (.768) (.785) (.827)
Observations 625 625 625 625 625 625 625 625
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Elmagrhi et al. (2017). This implies that the associations
between board gender diversity and dividend pay-outs
are based on whether the firms remain their exposures to
profitable investment opportunities. In the research con-
texts of Elmagrhi et al. (2017) and Saeed and
Sameer (2017), it is optimal for firms to capture those
lucrative investment opportunities. Therefore, firms with
high female representation tend to rationally capture this
event and hence utilize the internal sources for expansion
rather than dividend pay-outs. In our research, on the
other hand, large UK firms expose to less profitable
investments. As a result, female-led firms would instead
distribute free cash-flow to the shareholders. This action
can effectively reduce the agency conflicts within the
organizations. According to agency theory and prior
empirical literature (e.g., Byoun et al., 2016; Chen
et al., 2017), female directors can bring several benefits to
the boardroom and improve corporate governance qual-
ity. Additionally, the outcome hypothesis suggests that
companies with good corporate governance are more
likely to pay high dividends. Therefore, the finding of this
research is consistent with the theory, hypothesis and lit-
erature about board gender diversity and dividend pay-
outs. In term of economic significance, the coefficient of
Regression 4 recommends that an increase of 10% points
in the number of female directors on board is related to
0.067% points increase in the firm's cash dividend payout.
However, this result (for FTSE100 companies) is smaller
than the result of Chen et al. (2017) which was conducted
for S&P 1500 firms.
Interestingly, we further find a significantly negative
sign of the interaction term between BGD and M&A vari-
ables (i.e., BGD*ln(M&A)). This suggests that higher
number of M&A deals tends to reduce positive effect of
gender diversity on dividend payouts. We argue that free
cash flow level of larger companies is likely to be greater
than that of their smaller counterparts, leading to firm
choices in using the available internal resources like cash
for paying dividend to shareholders or M&A financing.
M&A per se and financing decision for M&A deals are
usually related to intense boardroom discussion amongst
directors and requires ultimate approval from corporate
senior layer (Levi et al., 2014). On a board having higher
proportion of female directors, it can be argued that the
M&A financing decisions might reflect feminine features
due to profoundly indispensable role of these female
directors. With the greater risk aversion level, higher
board gender diversity is, therefore, more likely to associ-
ate with cash financing decisions as this is the least risky
option compared to other outside resources (debt and
equity) which is in line with Pecking Order Theory of
Donaldson (1961). As a result, the cash resource avail-
ability will be deducted for dividend payouts. Therefore,
higher number of M&A deals is found to play a negative
moderating role on the positive association between
board gender diversity and payout levels.
In order to ensure that the findings are not limited to
the chosen measure of the independent variable (BGD),
in Panel B, we retested all the Regressions 1–4 by
replacing the number of female directors by the fraction
TABLE 4 (Continued)
Panel A—BGD: number of female directors Panel B—BGD: fraction of female directors
Dependent variable: Dividend/net income Dividend/net income
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
R-squared .166 .169 .170 .173 .171 .175 .176 .178
Wald Chi2 7.75*** 7.94*** 9.61*** 9.42*** 8.25*** 8.45*** 9.97*** 9.73***
Note: This table reports the findings of the ordinary least square regression for the impact of board gender diversity at board level and indi-
vidual level on dividend payment and how this impact is affected by the existence of mergers and acquisitions deals. Dividends divided by
net income is the dependent variable. The independent variables consist of the following. The number of female directors on board and the
fraction of female directors are the alternative measures of BGD, defined as the number of female directors on board, and the number of female
directors divided by the number of directors on boards, respectively. Female Chair (CEO) is measured by the dummy variable taking value of 1
if the Chair (CEO) is female and 0 otherwise. Ln(M&A) is the logarithm of the number of M&A deals during the accounting year. Board size is
the total number of directors on boards, and Ln(board size) is computed as natural logarithm of board size. Board independence is measured as
the number of independent directors divided by board size. Institutional ownership and insider ownership are estimated by the percentage of
institutional ownership and insider ownership, respectively. Ln(total assets) is the proxy for firm size, computed as natural logarithm of total
assets. Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Firm age is computed as natural logarithm of the age of each firm between 2006
and 2016. Tobin's q is measure by total debt plus market capitalisation divided by total assets. ROA is computed by net income over total assets.
Return volatility is defined as the volatility of ROA. Year-fixed effects are included in the regression. The statistical significance is based on auto-
correlation and heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors. Robust p values are reported in parentheses.
Abbreviations: BGD, boardroom gender diversity; M&A, mergers and acquisitions; ROA, return on assets.
***p < 1%; **p < 5%; *p < 10%.
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(percentage) of female directors serving on the board of
directors, to investigate its effect on dividend payment.
As reported in Regressions 5–8 respectively, results are
found to be consistent across all models indicating
robustness of our findings. That is, the number of female
directors serving on board is evidenced to have a positive
impact on dividend levels. However, such effect is weaker
when the firm experienced more number of M&A deals.
Moving to the control variables in the regressions from
(1) to (8), the results show that ROA has a significant and
positive impact on the dividend payment, which implies that
more profitable firms tend to pay higher dividends. Mean-
while, return volatility has a considerably negative influence
on dividend payouts, indicating that higher return volatility
can impose some constraints on dividend distribution. Both
findings are in line with the results of Chen et al. (2017). In
addition, leverage has a positive influence on dividend pay-
outs. This positive link between leverage and dividend pay-
out ratio is consistent with the finding of Chang and
Rhee (1990) who suggest that high dividend payment is
considered as a signal of financial situation, which allows
companies to borrow money at a good rate. Therefore,
companies with more debt financing tend to impose
higher dividends, indicating a positive association between
leverage and dividend payment (Chang & Rhee, 1990). In
terms of factors related to board characteristics, board size
has no significant effect on the dividend distribution whilst
the relationship between board independence and divi-
dend payment is negative. The negative link of board inde-
pendence and dividend payouts is in the same vein with
the finding of McGuinness, Lam, and Vieito (2015). It is
argued that firms tend to encourage independent directors
to disclose their opinions on company issues, and it is
found that the independent directors' disclosed opposition
to management policies reduces the propensity to pay divi-
dends (Tang, Du, & Hou, 2013). Therefore, the presence of
independent directors is considered as a brake against divi-
dend distribution (McGuinness et al., 2015).
5.2 | Senior female directors and
dividend payouts levels: The effect of
merger deals
Prior literature (e.g., Parrotta & Smith, 2013; Peni, 2012;
Strom, D'Espallier, & Mersland, 2014; Trinh et al., 2018)
shows extremely limited findings for the influence of
female Chairmen and CEOs on their firm's performance.
This study, therefore, tests for the effects of these direc-
tors' positions (i.e., Chair and CEO) on the nexus
between payouts and gender diversity.
Table 4 (Regressions 4 and 8) indicates an opposing
result on payout levels between female Chairman and
female CEO. That is, a female Chairman is positively
related to levels of dividends whilst a female CEO shows
its adverse influences on the payout. This can be
explained because although female CEOs are likely to
perform better than their male counterparts, CEOs could
be monitored more intensively by the board of directors
(Adams & Ferreira, 2007; Strom et al., 2014). They, thus,
may be reluctant to share information, which leads to
ineffective communication between them and other
directors, and in turn, makes a higher agency problem. In
addition, higher risk-averse features of a female CEO may
lead to the rejection of profitable projects and thus fail to
maximize the value of shareholders. This should not be
the case for the female Chairman, who possesses stronger
power and responsibilities towards board scrutiny and
board decision making. She is likely to be more cautious
and effective in providing her monitoring and advisory ser-
vices to the management team. This reduces agency con-
flicts between investors/shareholders and managers
(Parrotta & Smith, 2013; Peni, 2012; Trinh et al., 2018). As
a result, the female directors' positions will have an impact
on their performance of financial/payouts strategies when
a female Chair is more likely to reduce the agency con-
flicts within firms, and in turn, that is related to higher
levels of dividend payouts, relative to female CEO.
However, the interaction term between female Chair
and M&A deals (i.e., Female Chair*ln(M&A)) shows a
significantly negative sign which is opposite to the sign of
coefficient on Female Chair (+). This implies that a
higher number of M&A transactions have reduced the
positive effect of a female Chair on dividend payments
found in discussions above. In contrast, interestingly, we
find the opposite results for the case of a female CEO.
That is, more M&A deals have reduced the negative effect
of a female CEO on levels of payouts. The rationale
behind these findings can be driven by differential roles,
power and personal interests between Chairman and
CEO. For the female Chairman, her power is substantial
in boardroom decisions in both M&A financing decisions
and dividend policy. And her agency conflicts with the
board is lower as she plays a monitoring role on manage-
ment rather than participating in daily operations like a
CEO. Thus, the risk-aversion hypothesis of a female
Chairman is more intensified when deciding M&A
financing channels and paying dividends to shareholders.
However, this may not be the case for a female CEO
because her risk aversion feature is also related to deci-
sions and operations on a daily basis, typically invest-
ments. In addition, relative to a female Chairman, the
female CEO is more likely to have severe agency conflicts
with the board and shareholders as she may have her
self-interests and hence, behave at the expenses of those
stakeholders. These arguments initially explain the
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TABLE 5 Sensitivity tests—board gender composition and dividend payout policy, using alternative measure for dividend payouts
Panel A—BGD: number of female directors Panel B—BGD: fraction of female directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Dividend/TA Dividend yield Propensity to pay Dividend/TA Dividend yield Propensity to pay
BGD 0.004*** 0.249*** 0.304* 0.001*** 0.012** 0.036**
(.002) (.010) (.061) (.001) (.049) (.034)
Ln(M&A) 0.001 0.011 — 0.001 0.146 —
(.678) (.948) (.687) (.376)
BGD*ln(M&A) −0.001** −0.016* — −0.001** −0.010** —
(.041) (.081) (.039) (.014)
Female chair 0.067*** 7.840*** — 0.069*** 7.549*** —
(.004) (.000) (.003) (.000)
Female chair*ln(M&A) −0.036*** −2.258*** — −0.037*** −2.149*** —
(.000) (.001) (.000) (.003)
Female CEO −0.008* −0.054 — −0.010* 0.116 —
(.068) (.861) (.095) (.725)
Female CEO*ln(M&A) 0.001* 0.060 — 0.001* −0.114 —
(.080) (.770) (.097) (.595)
Ln(board size) −0.007* −0.817* −0.710 −0.002 −0.373 −0.349
(.072) (.076) (.487) (.579) (.407) (.720)
Board independence −0.005*** −0.510 −0.555 −0.006*** −0.505 −0.686
(.370) (.359) (.698) (.273) (.354) (.635)
Institutional ownership −0.010 −0.272 0.813 −0.010 −0.329 0.827
(.002) (.328) (.236) (.002) (.236) (.227)
Insider ownership 0.022 2.975** 5.709*** 0.022 2.784** 5.767***
(.281) (.011) (.000) (.269) (.020) (.000)
Ln(total assets) 0.003*** 0.487*** 0.518*** 0.003*** 0.494*** 0.544***
(.000) (.000) (.005) (.000) (.000) (.003)
Firm age 0.001 0.029 0.349 0.001 0.028 0.344
(.647) (.636) (.013) (.650) (.648) (.014)
Leverage 0.011* 1.978*** 2.649** 0.011* 1.968*** 2.665**
(.060) (.000) (.038) (.059) (.000) (.036)
Tobin's q 0.007*** 0.402*** 0.875** 0.007*** 0.402*** 0.906**
(.000) (.000) (.023) (.000) (.000) (.017)
ROA 0.002*** 0.046*** 0.202*** 0.002*** 0.045*** 0.203***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Return volatility −0.001 −0.057** −0.380*** −0.001 −0.060** −0.383***
(.141) (.030) (.000) (.139) (.024) (.000)
Year dummies YES YES YES YES YES YES
Constant −0.017 −3.517*** −7.680*** −0.029** −4.358*** −8.926***
(.178) (.002) (.004) (.014) (.000) (.001)
OLS method Yes Yes No Yes Yes No
Logit method No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 625 625 700 625 700 700
R2 .560 .294 — .564 .297 —
(Continues)
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likelihood for a female CEO to pay lower dividends so
she can retain more free cash flow for her self-purposes.
Furthermore, compared to male directors, they are still
risk-averse; therefore, retaining more cash instead of pay-
ing dividends enables her to mitigate the overall risk and
protect her reputation. When the number of M&A deals
increases, a female CEO will be controlled more inten-
sively by the board of directors. In this regard, she may
be forced to pay higher dividends to shareholders under
the tight scrutiny and deeper involvement of the whole
board in discussing important decisions. Another possible
reason is that the board of directors may put greater pres-
sure on a female CEO for raising funds from outside
sources to finance M&A deals. Thus, to make raising
external funds easier, the female CEO has an incentive to
pay out more dividends as an effective strategy to
increase firm value and public confidence about the
firm's current financial health, in line with signalling
theory.
6 | SENSITIVITIES AND
ROBUSTNESS TESTS
6.1 | Using alternative proxies for the
dividend payout policy
We first check if the effects of female leadership at board-
and individual-level on dividend policy, as well as the
moderating role of M&A deals on such relationship, alter
when using different measures for the dividend payment.
To do so, we replaced the dividend over net income by
other three alternative proxies including dividends over
total assets, dividend yield and the propensity (likeli-
hood) to pay cash dividends (see Chen et al., 2017).2
Table 5 (Panel A) reports results when we employ the
number of female directors as a measure for board gen-
der diversity. Panel B presents findings for the board gen-
der diversity proxied by the fraction of female directors.
Specifically, we report the results of those tests with three
alternative dependent variables which are dividends over
total assets in Regressions 1 and 4, dividend yield in
Regressions 2 and 5 and the propensity to pay dividends
in Regressions 3 and 6. All alternative tests reveal similar
results, which are accordance with the main findings.
Results for controls are relatively unchanged. Note that a
logit regression model is built to test for Regressions 3
and 6 because the dependent variable is a dummy vari-
able which takes value of 1 if the firm pays cash divi-
dends to shareholders and 0 otherwise.
6.2 | Excluding observations with
female CEO
We next exclude observations with female CEO because
the monitoring hypothesis is unlikely to apply to female
insider directors as argued in the study of Chen
et al. (2017). In Table 6, we report the consistent results
to Table 4 indicating that boards with more female
TABLE 5 (Continued)
Panel A—BGD: number of female directors Panel B—BGD: fraction of female directors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Variables Dividend/TA Dividend yield Propensity to pay Dividend/TA Dividend yield Propensity to pay
Wald Chi2 13.87*** 14.63*** 128*** 14.15*** 14.59*** 126***
Pseudo R2 — — .413 — — .415
Note: This table gives the sensitivity results of the OLS regression (Regressions 1–2 and 4–5) and Logit model (Regressions 3 and 6) for the
impact of board gender diversity at board level and individual level on dividend payment. The alternative proxies for dividend payouts
include dividends over total assets, dividend yield and propensity to pay dividend. The independent variables consist of the following: the
number of female directors on board, the fraction of female directors are the alternative measures of BGD, defined as the number of female
directors on board, and the number of female directors divided by the number of directors on boards, respectively. Female Chair (CEO) is
measured by the dummy variable taking value of 1 if the Chair (CEO) is female and 0 otherwise. Ln(M&A) is the logarithm of the number of
M&A deals during the accounting year. Board size is the total number of directors on boards, and Ln(board size) is computed as natural loga-
rithm of board size. Board independence is measured as the number of independent directors divided by board size. Institutional ownership
and insider ownership are estimated by the percentage of institutional ownership and insider ownership, respectively. Ln(total assets) is the
proxy for firm size, computed as natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is defined as total debt divided by total assets. Firm age is com-
puted as natural logarithm of the age of each firm between 2006 and 2016. Tobin's q is measure by total debt plus market capitalisation
divided by total assets. ROA, is computed by net income over total assets. Return volatility is defined as the volatility of ROA. Year-fixed
effects are included in the regression. The statistical significance is based on autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered
standard errors. Robust p values are reported in parentheses.
Abbreviations: BGD, boardroom gender diversity; M&A, mergers and acquisitions; OLS, ordinary least square; ROA, return on assets.
***p < 1%; **p < 5%; *p < 10%.
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members are likely to pay higher dividends. This finding
is consistent with the hypothesis predicting a positive
effect of board gender composition on dividend distribu-
tion. It also provides support for the outcome hypothesis
suggesting that good corporate governance contributes to
larger dividends paid. According to prior literature, gen-
der-diverse boards are more effective than homogeneous
boards in disciplining management through its effect on
dividend policy. Moreover, the presence of female mem-
bers on corporate boards can enhance the monitoring
function of boards and improve governance quality, lead-
ing to the higher level of dividend payment. The findings
also show that M&A deals tend to weaken the positive
effect of board gender diversity on payout policy.
6.3 | Random-effect generalized least
squares regression
In this section, we provide the result of a robustness check
by using random-effect generalized least squares (GLS)
regression. This method is expected to give more reliable
and powerful results since it can overcome the limitations
of OLS and fixed-effect regressions. Additionally, to resolve
the autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity problems, the
robust standard errors technique is employed. Table 7
(Regressions 1 and 3) shows a consistent result compared
to the main regressions. Specifically, the estimated coeffi-
cient of female directors on board shows a positive sign
and is statistically significant at the 1% level. This implies
that dividend payment increases with the proportion of
female directors on board. Furthermore, findings for
female Chair and female CEO, and their interactions with
M&A deals are also relatively unchanged.
6.4 | Endogeneity and two-step system
generalized method of moments
Two-step system generalized method of moments (GMM)
(Blundell & Bond, 1998) can solve the dynamic endo-
geneity of the board, which refers to previous realizations
TABLE 6 Sensitivity test—excluded observations with female CEO
Panel A—BGD: number of female directors Panel B—BGD: fraction of female directors
Dependent variable Dividend/net income Dividend/net income
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
BGD 0.063*** 0.063*** 0.006*** 0.006***
(.000) (.000) (.002) (.002)
Ln(M&A) 0.019 0.020 0.009 0.010
(.331) (.300) (.658) (.633)
BGD*ln(M&A) −0.012* −0.012* −0.001** −0.001**
(.082) (.092) (.044) (.046)
Female chair — 0.527*** — 0.544***
(.007) (.006)
Female chair*ln(M&A) — −0.276*** — −0.281***
(.001) (.001)
Constant 0.117 0.109 −0.003 −0.009
(.453) (.484) (.982) (.950)
Control included YES YES YES YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 581 581 581 581
R-squared .183 .188 .188 .193
Wald Chi2 7.34*** 9.30*** 7.83*** 9.53***
Note: This table reports the sensitivity results of the ordinary least square; regression for the impact of board gender diversity at board level and
individual level on dividend payment for a sample excluding observations with female CEO. Dividend over net income is the dependent vari-
able. A same set of independent variables used in Table 4 are included. Year-fixed effects are included in the regression. The statistical signifi-
cance is based on autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors. Robust p values are reported in parentheses.
Abbreviations: BGD, boardroom gender diversity; M&A, mergers and acquisitions.
***p < 1%; **p < 5%; *p < 10%.
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of the dependent factor affecting current levels of some
or all of the independent factors (Wintoki, Linck, & Net-
ter, 2012). Indeed, whilst past board structure can be cor-
related with current firm dividend payouts, current board
structure may also be a result of past firm payouts. Partic-
ularly, higher dividend payment in the past could cause a
substantial change in board members (e.g., replacing
male directors by female directors). To partially address
this issue, we followed the design of firm governance lit-
erature (e.g., Elnahass, Omoteso, Salama, & Trinh, 2019;
Pathan, 2009; Trinh, Elnahass, Salama, & Izzeldin, 2019),
to utilize the GMM. Table 7 (Regressions 2 and 4) reveals
TABLE 7 Robustness check—random-effect GLS and two-step system GMM
Panel A—BGD: number of female directors Panel B—BGD: fraction of female directors
Dependent variable Dividend/net income Dividend/net income
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
Dividend/NIt-1 — 0.198** — 0.229**
(.046) (.016)
BGD 0.058** 0.07*** 0.006** 0.007**
(.011) (.008) (.029) (.024)
Ln(M&A) 0.009 0.023 −0.001 0.020
(.681) (.419) (.953) (.478)
BGD*ln(M&A) −0.008* −0.016*** −0.001* −0.001**
(.091) (.009) (.083) (.035)
Female chair 0.523*** 1.952** 0.552*** 0.520**
(.005) (.028) (.002) (.049)
Female chair*ln(M&A) −0.245*** −0.761** −0.255*** −0.124*
(.001) (.032) (.000) (.096)
Female CEO −0.056* −0.236** −0.048** −0.074**
(.077) (.017) (.043) (.049)
Female CEO*ln(M&A) 0.046** 0.020* 0.048** 0.025*
(.017) (.082) (.034) (.063)
Constant 0.048 0.014 −0.086 0.033
(.814) (.793) (.663) (.961)
Control included YES YES YES YES
Random-effect GLS YES NO YES NO
GMM NO YES NO YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 625 550 625 550
AR(1) (p value) — .004 — .001
AR(2) (p value) — .811 — 993
Hansen test for over-
identification (p value)
— .136 — .196
Note: This table presents the sensitivity results of the random-effect GLS regressions and GMM for the impact of board gender diversity board
level and individual level on dividend payment. Dividend over net income is the dependent variable. A same set of independent variables
used in Table 4 are included. Running the GMM estimations, all results remain unchanged relative to main results in Table 4. Both, AR(1)
and AR(2), are tests for first-order and second-order autocorrelation. The Hansen test of over-identification is based on the null hypothesis
that all instrumental variables are valid. All results for these tests suggest a satisfaction of models' diagnostics which might produce reliable
findings. Year-fixed effects are included in the regression. The statistical significance is based on autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity
robust firm-clustered standard errors. Robust p values are reported in parentheses.
Abbreviations: BGD, boardroom gender diversity; GLS, generalized least squares; GMM, generalized method of moments; M&A, mergers
and acquisitions.
***p < 1%; **p < 5%; *p < 10%.
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that GMM results are accordance with the main results
obtained from OLS approach, implying that our results
are not driven by omitted variable bias, heterogeneity
and/or dynamic endogeneity issues.
6.5 | Lagged independent variables by 1
or 2 years
An alternative approach for endogeneity treatment is to
lag independent variables by 1 or 2 years in traditional
OLS regression models. In other words, we rerun
Regressions 4 and 8 in Table 4 by employing past values
of explanatory variables. This technique can be useful in
reducing potential endogeneity issues of most of vari-
ables, which exist in our regressions. Table 8 shows that
main results found in Table 4 are qualitatively
unchanged. Specifically, board gender diversity variable
is positively associated with levels of dividend payments.
This finding is negatively affected by the higher number
of M&A deals during the estimated period. In addition,
there is an opposing effect on dividend policy between
female Chair and female CEO. Thus, we believe that our
results are robust to endogeneity issues.
TABLE 8 Robustness check—lagged independent variables by 1 or 2 years
Panel A—BGD: number of female directors Panel B—BGD: fraction of female directors
Dependent variable Dividend/net income Dividend/net income
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4)
BGD 0.076*** 0.089*** 0.007*** 0.009***
(.000) (.000) (.004) (.000)
Ln(M&A) 0.039** 0.069*** 0.029 0.071***
(.041) (.001) (.171) (.002)
BGD*ln(M&A) −0.017** −0.027*** −0.001** −0.003***
(.045) (.003) (.025) (.009)
Female chair 0.812*** 0.837*** 0.781*** 0.803***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Female chair*ln(M&A) −0.381*** −0.400*** −0.370*** −0.386***
(.000) (.000) (.000) (.000)
Female CEO −0.124* −0.141** −0.117** −0.136*
(.073) (.039) (.021) (.69)
Female CEO*ln(M&A) 0.079* 0.096** 0.075* 0.091**
(.077) (.032) (.710) (.049)
Constant 0.259 0.279 0.129 0.182
(.139) (.145) (.437) (.315)
Control included YES YES YES YES
Lagged 1 years YES NO YES NO
Lagged 2 years NO YES NO YES
Year dummies YES YES YES YES
Observations 516 439 516 439
R squared 0.166 0.184 0.160 0.179
Wald Chi2 9.35*** 9.05*** 10.11*** 8.84***
Note: This table presents the sensitivity results of ordinary least square using lag values of independent variables for the impact of board gen-
der diversity board level and individual level on dividend payment. Dividend over net income is the dependent variable. A same set of inde-
pendent variables used in Table 4 are included but lagged by 1 or 2 years. Year-fixed effects are included in the regression. The statistical
significance is based on autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust firm-clustered standard errors. Robust p values are reported in
parentheses.
Abbreviations: BGD, boardroom gender diversity; M&A, mergers and acquisitions.
***p < 1%; **p < 5%; *p < 10%.
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6.6 | Propensity score matching
approach
The propensity score matching (PSM) approach of
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983) is also employed in this
study to solve the sample selection bias and possible
endogeneity of corporate governance variables. The
potential issue of endogeneity could be the causal associ-
ation between corporate governance such as board
gender diversity, and dividend payout levels. For
instance, firms with lower dividend payment could have
incentives to recruit female directors to manage their free
cash flow, which may lead to some spurious inferences.
Therefore, using a more reliable method to treat these
problems could improve the reliability and robustness of
our findings.
We followed Casu, Clare, Sarkisyan, and Thomas
(2013), Trinh, Aljughaiman, and Cao (2020), and
TABLE 9 Propensity score matching technique: the effect of board gender diversity on dividend policy
Dependent variable: dividend payout levels
Panel A: average treatment effects with nearest neighbour matching method
Treated (female) Control Δ SE t statistics
1:1 matching without replacement
Unmatched 0.417 0.341 0.076*** 0.018 4.19
Matched 0.412 0.341 0.071*** 0.019 3.70
1:1 matching with replacement
Unmatched 0.417 0.341 0.076*** 0.018 4.19
Matched 0.416 0.393 0.023** 0.027 2.82
Nearest neighbour (n = 2)
Unmatched 0.417 0.341 0.076*** 0.018 4.19
Matched 0.416 0.383 0.034** 0.024 2.36
Nearest neighbour (n = 3)
Unmatched 0.417 0.341 0.076*** 0.018 4.19
Matched 0.416 0.380 0.036** 0.023 2.52
Panel B: Average treatment effect on the treated with 1:1 nearest neighbour matching and bootstrapping of standard errors
Number of obs. Replications Observed (Δ) Bias SE t statistics
703 100 0.030** 0.004 0.030 2.993
703 1,000 0.030** 0.005 0.028 2.081
703 10,000 0.030** 0.006 0.027 2.101
Panel C: Regressions on matched samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Independent variables 1:1 matching without
replacement
1:1 matching with
replacement
Nearest neighbour
(n = 2)
Nearest neighbour (n = 3)
BGD dummy 0.056***
(.0003)
0.022*
(.074)
0.031*
(.095)
0.035**
(.050)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant −0.052
(.762)
−0.034
(.830)
−0.085
(.624)
−0.140
(.399)
Adjusted R-squared .111 .118 .126 .124
Observations 600 786 616 648
Note: Estimator: propensity-score matching. Treatment model: probit. The table reports the propensity score matching approach of the aver-
age treatment effects (ATE) of and ATT estimation with nearest neighbour Matching method and bootstrapping of standard errors. The ATE
and ATT of board gender diversity on the dividend policy (Δ) is estimated as the difference between the mean changes of firms having board
with female directors (column ‘Treated’) and that of matched firms having board without female directors (column ‘Nontreated’). p value is
presented in parentheses. t statistics based on standard errors are presented in final column.
Abbreviations: BGD, boardroom gender diversity.
***p < 1%; **p < 5%; *p < 10%.
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Elnahass et al. (2019) and did the following three steps:
(1) estimating propensity scores for firms with a board
with female directors (treatment group) and firms having
a board without female directors (control group). For this
step, we use a probit regression of a dummy response tak-
ing the value of one for firms with a board with female
directors and zero otherwise. (2) After getting the esti-
mated propensity scores of each group (treatment and
control), we proceed to match each observation of the
treatment group with one observation from the control
group. To do so, we use different techniques which
include the one-to-one nearest neighbour matching with
and without a replacement that the unit chosen from
male directors' observations, and nearest neighbour
matching with n = 2 and n = 3 with replacement. Appen-
dix shows the quality of matching by using the distribu-
tion of the propensity score before and after matching.
(3) Estimating an average board gender diversity effect by
performing regressions on the matched samples.
Table 9 shows univariate test results for the average
treatment effects (ATE – Panel A) and average treatment
effects on the treated (ATT) estimation with boo-
tstrapping of standard errors (i.e., 100, 1,000, and 10,000
replications) (Panel B). We find that the dividend level is
higher for firms with a board with female directors than
for firms with a board without female directors. This
result is consistent when we use a different PSM tech-
nique. After employing bootstrapping of standard errors
with different replications, we find the same result. In
Table 9 (Panel C), we further report regression test results
of board gender diversity (dummy) on dividend levels,
which show positive coefficients across all Models 1–4.
This suggests that the positive relationship between
board gender diversity and dividend payout is robust
when using PSM. In sum, our results, found in Table 4,
are relatively strong even after treating for the issues of
endogeneity and sample selection bias.
7 | CONCLUDING REMARKS
This study explores the relationship between board gen-
der composition and cash dividend payment for a sample
of industrial firms traded on the FTSE 100 during the
period 2006–2016. The main theoretical framework of
this study is the agency theory which focusses on the con-
flicts of goals between managers and shareholders as well
as the information asymmetries in companies that allow
managers to maximize their own benefits rather than act-
ing in the shareholders' benefit. Board of directors plays a
crucial role in reducing agency problems through their
influences on organizational dividend decisions. As a
result, researchers and practitioners have consistently
attempted to research ways to improve the quality of the
boards. Amongst many remedies, the incorporation of
females within boards is a promising way that is claimed
to enhance the effectiveness of boards in the decision-
making process. Related studies on board gender diver-
sity and dividend payouts show mixed results on the
effect of gender-diverse boards on dividend payment with
signs of both positive and negative effects.
Our findings provide evidence in favour of the outcome
hypothesis, revealing that gender-diverse boards can
enhance governance quality and thereby have a positive
influence on dividend distribution. This supports the first
hypothesis and is consistent with previous studies. The find-
ing is still significant and robust with the use of different
measures of dividend payouts and female board representa-
tion, as well as alternative model specifications. However,
interestingly, when we employ the number of M&A deals as
a moderating channel on the relationship between female
leadership and dividend policy, we find that higher number
of M&A deals tends to reduce the positive effect of gender
diversity on dividend payouts. Additional analyses show
opposing effects of a female Chairman and a female CEO
on the dividend payouts strategies. Although the female
Chair is positively associated with a level of payouts, the
female CEO shows an adverse impact. However, the M&A
deals have reduced these positive and negative effects of
female Chair and female CEO, respectively.
Future research might include financial education or
other characteristics of directors on boards such as quali-
fication or age that can have effects on dividend policy.
In addition, country-level characteristics such as disclo-
sure requirement index and creditor rights index can be
included in the research about the determinants of divi-
dend payouts. Moreover, to explore the effect of board
characteristics on dividend payment, further research can
include different board characteristics such as CEO role
duality and board meeting. Additionally, further studies
can look at the effect of gender-diverse boards on payouts
in three periods including before a financial crisis, during
a financial crisis and after a financial crisis. Finally,
future studies can investigate the relationship between
female leadership and dividend payment in other devel-
oped countries to compare the results between the UK
and other countries. Further studies can conduct research
with a sample of developing countries to examine
whether there are any differences in the findings of the
relationship between female leadership and dividend
payment between developed and developing countries.
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ENDNOTES
1 Spencer Stuart Board Index in 2018 found that 50% of the S&P
500 companies have a combined Board Chair/CEO, in contrast
with 0.7% (only 11 firms out of 150 firms) of FTSE 150.
2 Unreported statistics indicate their means as 2.9 and 2.597% and
low standard deviations as 0.027 and 1.887, respectively.
DATA AVAILABILITY STATEMENT
The data that support the findings of this study are avail-
able from the corresponding author upon reasonable
request.
ORCID
Vu Quang Trinh https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2606-2958
REFERENCES
Abor, J., & Fiador, V. (2013). Does corporate governance explain
dividend policy in sub-Saharan Africa? International Journal of
Law and Management, 55(3), 201–225.
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2007). A theory of friendly boards.
The Journal of Finance, 62(1), 217–250.
Adams, R. B., & Ferreira, D. (2009). Women in the boardroom and
their impact on governance and performance. Journal of Finan-
cial Economics, 94(2), 291–309.
Adams, R. B., Gray, S., & Nowland, J. (2011). Does gender matter in the
boardroom? Evidence from the market reaction to mandatory new
director announcements, USA: Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.
com/abstract=1953152 or http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1953152.
Ahern, K. R., & Dittmar, A. K. (2012). The changing of the boards:
The impact on firm valuation of mandated female board repre-
sentation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 127(1), 137–197.
Aivazian, V., Booth, L., & Cleary, S. (2003). Do emerging market
firms follow different dividend policies from US firms? Journal
of Financial Research, 26(3), 371–387.
Al-Najjar, B., & Hussainey, K. (2009). The association between divi-
dend payout and outside directorships. Journal of Applied
Accounting Research, 10(1), 4–19.
Al-Rahahleh, A. S. (2017). Corporate governance quality, board gender
diversity and corporate dividend policy: Evidence from Jordan. Aus-
tralasianAccounting, Business and Finance Journal, 11(2), 86–104.
Baysinger, B. D., & Butler, H. N. (1985). Corporate governance and
the board of directors: Performance effects of changes in board
composition. Journal of Law, Economics, & Organization, 1(1),
101–124.
Blundell, R., & Bond, S. (1998). Initial conditions and moment
restrictions in dynamic panel data models. Journal of Econo-
metrics, 87(1), 115–143.
Bradshaw, P., & Wicks, D. (2000). The experiences of white women
on corporate boards in Canada. In Women on corporate boards
of directors (pp. 197–212). Dordrecht: Springer.
Brockman, P., & Unlu, E. (2009). Dividend policy, creditor rights,
and the agency costs of debt. Journal of Financial Economics,
92(2), 276–299.
Bulan, L., & Yan, Z. (2010). Firm maturity and the pecking order
theory. Firm maturity and the pecking order Theory, 9(3),
179–200.
Byoun, S., Chang, K., & Kim, Y. S. (2016). Does corporate board
diversity affect corporate payout policy? Asia-Pacific Journal of
Financial Studies, 45(1), 48–101.
Byrnes, J. P., Miller, D. C., & Schafer, W. D. (1999). Gender differ-
ences in risk taking: A meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin,
125(3), 367–383.
Carter, D. A., D'Souza, F., Simkins, B. J., & Simpson, W. G. (2010).
The gender and ethnic diversity of US boards and board com-
mittees and firm financial performance. Corporate Governance:
An International Review, 18(5), 396–414.
Casu, B., Clare, A., Sarkisyan, A., & Thomas, S. (2013). Securitiza-
tion and bank performance. Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing, 45(8), 1617–1658.
Chang, R. P., & Rhee, S. G. (1990). The impact of personal taxes on
corporate dividend policy and capital structure decisions.
Financial Management, 19, 21–31.
Chen, G., Crossland, C., & Huang, S. (2016). Female board repre-
sentation and corporate acquisition intensity. Strategic Manage-
ment Journal, 37(2), 303–313.
Chen, J., Leung, W. S., & Goergen, M. (2017). The impact of board
gender composition on dividend payouts. Journal of Corporate
Finance, 43, 86–105.
Conyon, M. J., & He, L. (2017). Firm performance and boardroom
gender diversity: A quantile regression approach. Journal of
Business Research, 79, 198–211.
Core, J. E., Guay, W. R., & Rusticus, T. O. (2006). Does weak gover-
nance cause weak stock returns? An examination of firm oper-
ating performance and investors' expectations. The Journal of
Finance, 61(2), 655–687.
Croson, R., & Gneezy, U. (2009). Gender differences in preferences.
Journal of Economic Literature, 47(2), 448–474.
DeAngelo, H., DeAngelo, L., & Stulz, R. M. (2006). Dividend policy
and the earned/contributed capital mix: A test of the life-cycle
theory. Journal of Financial Economics, 81(2), 227–254.
Donaldson, G. (1961). Corporate debt capacity. Boston, MA: Har-
vard University Press.
Dowling, M., & Aribi, Z. A. (2013). Female directors and UK com-
pany acquisitiveness. International Review of Financial Analy-
sis, 29, 79–86.
Elmagrhi, M. H., Ntim, C. G., Crossley, R. M., Malagila, J. K.,
Fosu, S., & Vu, T. V. (2017). Corporate governance and divi-
dend payout policy in UK listed SMEs: The effects of corporate
board characteristics. International Journal of Accounting &
Information Management, 25(4), 459–483.
Elnahass, M., Omoteso, K., Salama, A., & Trinh, V. Q. (2019). Dif-
ferential market valuations of board busyness across alternative
banking models. Review of Quantitative Finance and Account-
ing, 55, 201–238.
Faccio, M., & Lasfer, M. A. (2000). Do occupational pension funds
monitor companies in which they hold large stakes? Journal of
Corporate Finance, 6(1), 71–110.
Faccio, M., Marchica, M. T., & Mura, R. (2016). CEO gender, corpo-
rate risk-taking, and the efficiency of capital allocation. Journal
of Corporate Finance, 39, 193–209.
Fama, E. F., & French, K. R. (2001). Disappearing dividends:
Changing firm characteristics or lower propensity to pay? Jour-
nal of Financial Economics, 60(1), 3–43.
Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Separation of ownership and
control. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 301–325.
20 TRINH ET AL.
Gordon, M. J. (1960). Security and a financial theory of investment.
The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 74(3), 472–492.
Grullon, G., Michaely, R., & Swaminathan, B. (2002). Are dividend
changes a sign of firm maturity? Journal of Business, 75,
387–424.
Gul, F. A., Srinidhi, B., & Ng, A. C. (2011). Does board gender diver-
sity improve the informativeness of stock prices? Journal of
Accounting and Economics, 51(3), 314–338.
Harford, J., Mansi, S. A., & Maxwell, W. F. (2008). Corporate gover-
nance and firm cash holdings in the US. Journal of Financial
Economics, 87(3), 535–555.
Hayward, M. L., & Hambrick, D. C. (1997). Explaining the pre-
miums paid for large acquisitions: Evidence of CEO hubris.
Administrative Science Quarterly, 42, 103–127.
Hillman, A. J., & Dalziel, T. (2003). Boards of directors and firm
performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence per-
spectives. Academy of Management Review, 28(3), 383–396.
Hillman, A. J., Shropshire, C., & Cannella, A. A., Jr. (2007). Organi-
zational predictors of women on corporate boards. Academy of
Management Journal, 50(4), 941–952.
Hu, A., & Kumar, P. (2004). Managerial entrenchment and payout
policy. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 39(4),
759–790.
Jensen, M., & Meckling, W. (1976). Theory of the firm: Manage-
ment behavior, agency costs and capital structure. Journal of
Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360.
Jensen, M. C. (1986). Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate
finance, and takeovers. The American Economic Review, 76(2),
323–329.
Kanadlı, S. B., Torchia, M., & Gabaldon, P. (2018). Increasing
women's contribution on board decision-making: The impor-
tance of chairperson leadership efficacy and board openness.
European Management Journal, 36(1), 91–104.
Kennedy, P. (2003). A guide to econometrics, USA: MIT Press.
Khoury, R. E., & Maladjian, C. (2014). Determinants of the dividend
policy: An empirical study on the Lebanese listed banks. Inter-
national Journal of Economics and Finance, 6(4), 240–256.
Kim, D., & Starks, L. T. (2016). Gender diversity on corporate
boards: Do women contribute unique skills? American Eco-
nomic Review, 106(5), 267–271.
Leary, M. T., & Michaely, R. (2011). Determinants of dividend
smoothing: Empirical evidence. The Review of Financial Stud-
ies, 24(10), 3197–3249.
Levi, M., Li, K., & Zhang, F. (2014). Director gender and mergers
and acquisitions. Journal of Corporate Finance, 28, 185–200.
Lintner, J. (1962). Dividends, earnings, leverage, stock prices and
the supply of capital to corporations. The Review of Economics
and Statistics, 44, 243–269.
Litai, C., Chuan, L., & Kim, Y. C. (2011). Financial characteristics,
corporate governance and the propensity to pay cash dividends
of Chinese listed companies. International Business and Man-
agement, 3(1), 176–188.
Mansourinia, E., Emamgholipour, M., Rekabdarkolaei, E. A., &
Hozoori, M. (2013). The effect of board size, board indepen-
dence and CEO duality on dividend policy of companies: Evi-
dence from Tehran stock exchange. International Journal of
Economy, Management and Social Sciences, 2(6), 237–241.
Masulis, R. W., Wang, C., & Xie, F. (2007). Corporate governance
and acquirer returns. The Journal of Finance, 62(4), 1851–1889.
Matsa, D. A., & Miller, A. R. (2013). A female style in corporate
leadership? Evidence from quotas. American Economic Journal:
Applied Economics, 5(3), 136–169.
McGuinness, P. B., Lam, K. C., & Vieito, J. P. (2015). Gender and
other major board characteristics in China: Explaining corpo-
rate dividend policy and governance. Asia Pacific Journal of
Management, 32(4), 989–1038.
Miller, T., & del Carmen Triana, M. (2009). Demographic diversity in
the boardroom: Mediators of the board diversity–firm performance
relationship. Journal of Management Studies, 46(5), 755–786.
Mülbert, P. O. (2010). Corporate Governance of Banks after the Finan-
cial Crisis - Theory, Evidence, Reforms. ECGI - Law Working Paper
No. 130/2009 (1–45 pp.). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/
abstract=1448118 or http://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1448118
Parrotta, P., & Smith, N. (2013). Female-Led Firms: Performance
and Risk Attitudes. Bonn: IZA Institute for the Study of Labor.
Pathan, S. (2009). Strong boards, CEO power and bank risk-taking.
Journal of Banking and Finance, 33(7), 1340–1350.
Peni, E. (2012). Essays on the effects of female executives and experts
on corporate governance and financial reporting practices, Fin-
land: University of Vaasa.
Pooley, C. R.. (2019). Women board directors hit 30% milestone on
FTSE 350. FT.com. Retrieved from https://www.ft.com/
content/37e77374-e44c-11e9-9743-db5a370481bc.
Pucheta-Martínez, M. C., & Bel-Oms, I. (2016). The board of direc-
tors and dividend policy: The effect of gender diversity. Indus-
trial and Corporate Change, 25(3), 523–547.
Puranam, P., Powell, B. C., & Singh, H. (2006). Due diligence failure
as a signal detection problem. Strategic Organization, 4(4),
319–348.
Redding, L. S. (1997). Firm size and dividend payouts. Journal of
Financial Intermediation, 6(3), 224–248.
Rosenbaum, P. R., & Rubin, D. B. (1983). The central role of the
propensity score in observational studies for causal effects. Bio-
metrika, 70(1), 41–55.
Rozeff, M. S. (1982). Growth, beta and agency costs as determinants of
dividend payout ratios. Journal of Financial Research, 5(3), 249–259.
Saeed, A., & Sameer, M. (2017). Impact of board gender diversity on
dividend payments: Evidence from some emerging economies.
International Business Review, 26(6), 1100–1113.
Strom, R. Ø., D'Espallier, B., & Mersland, R. (2014). Female leader-
ship, performance, and governance in microfinance institu-
tions. Journal of Banking and Finance, 42, 60–75.
Tang, X., Du, J., & Hou, Q. (2013). The effectiveness of the mandatory
disclosure of independent directors' opinions: Empirical evidence
from China. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, 32(3), 89–125.
Terjesen, S., Sealy, R., & Singh, V. (2009). Women directors on cor-
porate boards: A review and research agenda. Corporate Gover-
nance: An International Review, 17(3), 320–337.
Trinh, V., Pham, H., Pham, T., & Nguyen, G. (2018). Female leader-
ship and value creation: Evidence from London stock
exchange. Corporate Ownership and Control, 15, 248–257.
Trinh, V. Q., Aljughaiman, A., & Cao, N. D. (2020). Fetching better
deals from creditors: Board busyness, agency relationships and
the bank cost of debt. International Review of Financial Analy-
sis, 69, 101472.
Trinh, V. Q., Elnahass, M., Salama, A., & Izzeldin, M. (2019). Board
busyness, performance and financial stability: Does bank type
matter? The European Journal of Finance, 26, 774–801.
TRINH ET AL. 21
Ward, A. M., & Forker, J. (2017). Financial management effective-
ness and board gender diversity in member-governed, commu-
nity financial institutions. Journal of Business Ethics, 141(2),
351–366.
Wintoki, M. B., Linck, J. S., & Netter, J. M. (2012). Endogeneity and
the dynamics of internal corporate governance. Journal of
Financial Economics, 105(3), 581–606.
How to cite this article: Trinh VQ, Cao ND,
Dinh LH, Nguyen HN. Boardroom gender diversity
and dividend payout strategies: Effects of mergers
deals. Int J Fin Econ. 2020;1–22. https://doi.org/10.
1002/ijfe.2106
APPENDIX A.
Distributions of propensity score before and after matching.
22 TRINH ET AL.
